Recycling the Petrodollar: Current Problem, Future Opportunity by Pattillo, Donald M.
SYMPOSIUM 
INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS OF PETROMONEY: 
AFTERMATH OF THE ENERGY CRISIS 
Petrodollars-The Recycling Problem: 
Some Introductory Remarks 
The Petrodollar Energy Crisis: 
An Overview and Interpretation 
Recycling the Petrodollar: 
Current Problem, Future Opportunity 
The European Community and the 
Recycling of Petrodollars 
1
Pattillo: Recycling Petrodollars
Published by SURFACE, 1975
EDITOR'S PREFACE 
The following four articles were prepared in anticipation of the 
Twelfth Annual Regional Meeting of the American Society of Inter-
national Law, which was to have been held at the Syracuse Univer-
sity College of Law on April 5, 1975. Unfortunately, a paralyzing 
snowstorm on the weekend of the meeting forced a cancellation of 
the proceedings. 
The four papers published in this issue outline the proposed 
discussion. The remarks of Mr. Sassoon were prepared as an intro-
duction to a session on the necessary role of international financial 
institutions, while the article by Dean Alnasrawi which follows was 
scheduled as the keynote, presenting his overview of the petrodollar 
problem. Professor Pattillo, originally scheduled as a member of the 
panel discussing petromoney investment problems in the United 
States and elsewhere, subsequently submitted an analysis of bal-
ance of payments problems generated by the new petrofunds. Com-
pleting this section is the presentation scheduled to open the after-
noon session, an analysis by Professor Herzog of the response of the 
"European Community" to the petromoney imbalance. The eco-
nomic analyses of these articles, especially those of Mr. Sassoon and 
Dean Alnasrawi, are based upon data available at the time of con-
ference. 
The College of Law International Law Society would like to 
express its appreciation to those persons yet unmentioned who had 
graciously agreed to attend the Twelfth Annual Regional Meeting: 
Associate Professor Jon E. Bischel; Pierre De Ravel D'Esclapon, 
Esq.; James G. Evans, Jr., Esq.; Associate Professor George M. 
Frankfurter; Professor L.F.E. Goldie; Assistant Professor Douglass 
J. Klein; Professor Eric Lawson; Howard Mennell, Esq.; Lester 
Nurick, Esq.; and James E. Price, Esq. 
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RECYCLING THE PETRODOLLAR: CURRENT 
PROBLEM, FUTURE OPPORTUNITY 
Donald M. Pattillo* 
I. THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND THE 
PETRODOLLAR 
The balance of payments (BOP) is a concept which is poorly 
understood by most Americans. While the news media report devel-
opments in the balance of international payments, the American 
public is unlikely to understand how it is affected directly. Most 
reports lead the public to believe that a BOP surplus is "good," that 
a BOP deficit is "bad," and that a decline in the value of the U.S. 
dollar in relation to other currencies is also harmful to U.S. inter-
ests. While none of these beliefs is necessarily correct, there is no 
question that present oil prices have had a significant impact on the 
international financial position of the United States. This leads to 
one aspect of the U.S. economy to which any citizen can relate, the 
high price of gasoline and other petroleum products. The American 
public is aware of the Arab oil boycott of 1973-74 and of the emerg-
ence of the "oil weapon" in international politics. It is also aware 
of the existence of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries (OPEC) which, in the past two years, has quadrupled the price 
of oil to the present level of approximately $11.50 per barrel. 1 The 
American public, despite a somewhat vague understanding of the 
balance of payments, may still perceive a relationship between what 
the United States pays for imported oil and the trend of the balance 
of payments. 
In fact, have the U.S. balance of payments position and the 
value of our currency in relation to other national currencies been 
weakened by the increased petroleum prices? The answer is not self-
evident. While increased imported oil prices have undoubtedly 
caused certain difficulties in the U.S. economy and in the BOP, it 
is entirely possible that over the long-term this situation could be 
economically advantageous to the United States. 
II. THE CURRENT SITUATION 
Successive dollar devaluations and the emergence of a joint 
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Finance, Syracuse University School of Management; 
B.S ., University of Alabama; M.B.A., Georgia State University . 
1. Bus. WEEK, Oct. 13, 1975, at 34. 
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float or "snake" of major European currencies, occurring before the 
1973 oil crisis, resulted in a U.S. dollar which was much lower in 
value in relation to most European currencies than in earlier years.2 
By 1975, most observers felt that the U.S. dollar had depreciated 
to the point that it was significantly undervalued in terms of pur-
chasing power. Very advantageous prices of U.S. goods and services, 
reflecting the lower value of the U.S. dollar, have given the United 
States a strong trade position in recent months. Thus, the trade 
account of the U.S. balance of payments has shown a marked im-
provement in 1975.3 International currency markets undoubtedly 
have taken note of the undervalued U.S. dollar, as it has risen 
sharply against other major currencies since July 1975. These devel-
opments have occured even though the United States is continuing 
to pay the OPEC prices for imported oil. 
While the U.S. position is basically sound, oil prices clearly 
have caused continuing and severe financial problems in many 
other oil importing countries. Even where the total volume of oil 
imports has declined, the present price levels have created sharp 
BOP deficits for these countries and heavy outpayments have been 
necessary.4 Somewhat ironically, the decline in the value of the U.S. 
dollar since the beginning of the oil crisis has resulted in the oil 
exporting countries' receiving somewhat less in real purchasing 
power. (Oil exporters generally have been paid in U.S. dollars, due 
to the dollar's worldwide acceptability and its status as the standard 
international transactions currency.) Much of the justification for 
the recent OPEC price increase has been the decline in purchasing 
power related to the accepting and holding of U.S. dollars. 5 A re-
lated justification is that an increased price was necessary to offset 
the current worldwide inflation, even though quadrupled oil prices 
have been blamed for the inflation in the first place. 
At the recent OPEC conference, the member states agreed to 
cease the pricing of oil in dollars and to begin pricing oil in units of 
Special Drawing Rights (SDR's) of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). The SDR, the so-called "paper gold" was created in 
1969 to increase world reserves and add to international liquidity, 
and was established as equivalent to the 1969 U.S. dollar (1 SDR 
= $1 U.S.). 6 With the two dollar devaluations, the IMF changed the 
2. 1974 IMF ANN. REP. 47. 
3. Bus. WEEK, Mar. 17, 1975, at 18; Wall St. J., May 28, 1975, at 2, col. 2. 
4. Mayer, A Bad Year for the Rich Countries, FORTUNE, Aug. 1974, at 159. 
5. Wall St. J ., Mar. 17, 1975, at 15, col. 1. 
6. M. KREININ, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 160 (2d ed. 1975). 
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value of the SDR to the sum of specified portions of a "market 
basket" of 16 important currencies. 7 The current SDR value is 
around $1.20 U.S. While OPEC oil will now be priced in SDR's (the 
current price should be about 1 bbl. = 9 SDR), actual payment will 
continue to be made in dollars, still the currency most preferred by 
the oil exporters. 
In separate but related developments, several oil exporting 
countries have ended the practice of tying the value of their curren-
cies to the U.S. dollar and now set their values by the SDR. 8 Saudi 
Arabia was among the producing nations making this change. 
III. WHAT RECYCLING MEANS 
The importers' problems in paying for oil and the concern of 
oil producers about the value of their revenues lead to consideration 
of the ultimate disposition of these oil funds, now known as petro-
dollars, and to their subsequent use in trade and in investment. The 
term appears to have been coined by former Secretary of Commerce 
Peter G. Peterson in describing those dollars received by the OPEC 
members in payment for their oil. Thus, the term refers not to any 
special or unique feature of the funds, but to their origin. A dollar 
sent overseas in payment for oil becomes a petrodollar. For example, 
if Japan purchases oil from Abu Dhabi, using U.S. dollars as pay-
ment, these dollars become petrodollars. If Abu Dhabi then deposits 
these funds in a British bank, they are considered petrodollar depos-
its. With the current value of petroleum-based international trans-
actions, petrodollars have become a major source of investment cap-
ital for the world, of which there is an overall shortage. 
Since the OPEC members are all considered members of the 
Third World and are not highly industrialized outside the oil sector, 
their economies are very small in absolute terms. Their petrodollars 
have accumulated at a rate and magnitude far greater than their 
domestic economics can absorb. For the OPEC members, the prob-
lem is not a shortage of development capital, but rather how this 
capital can be used effectively. 
While the petrodollar inflows have become a major source of 
domestic economic development capital, enabling most OPEC 
members to finance ambitious development and national defense 
programs, the volume of petrodollars has provided a major chal-
7. IMF ANN. REP., supra note 2, at 51. 
8. Wall St. J., supra note 5. 
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lange for the international financial system, that is, the accomoda-
tion of surplus funds. Surplus funds refers to those funds which 
cannot be spent on imports or invested immediately in the local 
economy or in local financial markets.9 With the worldwide petro-
dollar surplus estimated at over $60 billion for 1974 and nearly $40 
billion for 1975, 10 the challenge to the financial system is not only 
the accommodation of the volume of deposits, but also the "recyc-
ling" of the petrodollars. Ways must be devised for the dollar sur-
pluses to be spent in the importing countries, or otherwise to find 
their way back into the national treasuries to finance continued oil 
imports. 
Even before the present impact of world oil prices, it had been 
recognized that those nations experiencing a balance of payments 
surplus should increase spending abroad, since the continued accu-
mulation of surpluses is pointless and may lead to domestic infla-
tion through expansion of the money supply. As stated previously, 
any two-way international transaction amounts to a recycling, since 
earnings from exports provide funds with which to purchase im-
ports. The current problem, of course, was brought about by the 
sheer magnitude of the petrodollar surpluses. Before the 1973 oil 
boycott and the sharp increase in OPEC oil prices, surpluses could 
be accomodated easily by the international financial system. 
The advent of quadrupled oil prices, without offsetting conser-
vation programs or effective energy substitutes in the importing 
countries, resulted in the "pileup," or surplus, of petrodollars that 
exists presently. The OPEC members are dealing with the problem 
of absorbing the petrodollar in payments, and the importing nations 
have faced the pressing problem of financing continued oil imports 
at present price levels. The international banking system, which 
found petrodollar deposits escalating rapidly, feared for the stability 
of the financial markets, and many industrial countries feared mas-
sive takeover attempts of major industries by OPEC members. 
Sudden withdrawals or shifts of petrodollar deposits, with resultant 
instability in the foreign exchange market, led to widespread con-
cern of major banking failures and chaotic economic conditions in 
Western importing countries. In addition, the borrowing facilities of 
the International Monetary Fund were inadequate to provide deficit 
nations the funds needed to finance oil imports. Default on interna-
tional loans to such severely affected nations as Great Britain and 
9. Bus. WEEK, Jan. 20, 1975, at 34. 
10. Stabler, Estimates of Petrodollar Surplus Are Cut; Some Predict Additional 
Downgradings, Wall St. J., May 23, 1975, at 4, col. 2. 
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Italy became a recognized possibility." 
Compared with most other industrialized cpuntries, the United 
States is in a secure position. While the OPEC oil prices have had 
a severe impact on the U.S. economy and are felt to have increased 
the severity of the current recession, the United States possesses 
great advantages over Western Europe and Japan in that it is far 
less dependent on imported oil, and has highly-developed financial 
markets with which to attract and hold foreign investment. 12 
Other industrial nations, however, still possess advantages 
when compared with the less-developed countries, which have been 
more severely affected. Industrialized countries have diversified and 
productive economies with which to generate increased exports and 
provide development assistance to the OPEC members, while si-
multaneously developing alternative energy sources and reducing 
dependence on imported oil without regard to future oil prices . 
These alternatives seldom exist for the poorer oil importing coun-
tries. These poorer countries face severe difficulties in financing 
necessary imports even in the best of years and have not yet re-
ceived a price break from OPEC. 
It should now be seen that the petrodollar recycling question 
involves consideration of several viewpoints, including those of the 
OPEC members, the industrialized importing nations, the less-
developed importing countries, and the international institutional 
framework in which solutions would be implemented. 
IV PROBLEMS OF THE OPEC MEMBERS 
While much of the discussion of the petrodollar problem has 
focused on the means oil importers would use to pay for oil, there 
are very pressing problems facing OPEC members as well. Most of 
these nations have relatively small economies in terms of industrial 
diversity and developed infrastructure. The massive increase in pe-
trodollar inflows to the oil producing countries was not preceded by 
adequate planning on the part of the recipients for the effective 
utilization of their wealth. Many importers faced with the burden 
of meeting the rising oil prices of a unified OPEC cartel have turned 
to recycling petrodollars. This recycling has most often taken the 
form of loans by the oil exporters to the importers, which would be 
used to finance continued oil imports. The problem with this ap-
11. Bus. WEEK, Oct. 12, 1974, at 40. 
12. Mayer, Oil, Trade, and the Dollar, FORTUNE, June 1974, at 197. 
7
Pattillo: Recycling Petrodollars
Published by SURFACE, 1975
418 Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 3:413 
proach was, of course, the necessity of eventual repayment of the 
loans. Such an arrangement, without a fundamental change in the 
relationship between supplier and consumer, could only postpone 
the eventual reckoning. Not surprisingly, most OPEC members 
have been unenthusiastic about large-scale unsecured government-
to-government loan arrangements, and therefore remain faced with 
the problem of finding the most effective means to use their oil 
riches. 
Since all OPEC members are still classified as members of the 
Third World, oil exports at the higher prices represented the oppor-
tunity to move toward a prosperous future. Massive economic devel-
opment programs were undertaken; those already underway in such 
nations as Kuwait and Iran were expanded further under the impe-
tus of these surplus funds. Any national development plan is neces-
sarily long-range, involving decades rather than years, and projects 
must be undertaken in the most effective sequence. These large 
amounts of funds would remain idle until they could be utilized 
effectively in the development program. This, then, leads to the 
problem of petrodollar surplus. OPEC members can and have in-
creased outlays for such development-related programs as national 
defense and increased imports from the industrial countries. But, 
these expenditures cannot be made in a short-term context either, 
and likewise must be phased over several years. 
There has been a visible increase in foreign business invest-
ment, especially by Saudi Arabia, but indications are that such 
Arab investment will not be of the magnitude once expected (or 
feared), as Arab investors appear to be rather conservative and have 
shown little interest in any takeovers of major Western corpora-
tions.13 It appears, for the short-term, that most Arab investments 
will be in the area of financial instruments rather than into indus-
try. Foreign purchases of U.S. treasury bonds are on the increase. 
There are, regardless of risk, some government-to-government 
loans involving OPEC and importing nations, with petrodollars 
being used to finance foreign aid programs to less-developed import-
ing nations. Therefore, surplus petrodollar funds which cannot be 
used elsewhere tend to become short-term deposits in large Euro-
pean banks. Most of these deposits are accepted only on a short-
term basis because of their potential volatility, and often at some-
what unfavorable interest rates. 14 
13. Wall St. J., Mar. 19, 1975, at 5, col. 1. 
14. Bus. WEEK, supra note 9. 
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Another problem faced by many OPEC members is that of 
inflation, induced by both rapid expansion of the domestic money 
supply and mushrooming demand for goods and services on the part 
of private citizens and governments. The oil producers are finding 
that not all aspects of their new oil riches are positive. 
V. PROBLEMS OF DEVELOPED IMPORTING COUNTRIES 
For reasons already stated, the problems of the United States 
in financing oil imports or in attracting petrodollar investments are 
not so severe as those faced by other industrialized nations, princi-
pally Japan and those in Western Europe. These nations have been 
forced into emergency borrowing to pay for current imports. While 
such borrowing helps in the initial period, it does nothing to alle-
viate their dependence on imported oil or improve their ability to 
pay. 
For the immediate future, it appears that the most effective 
policy for the industrialized countries to follow is the enforcement 
of strong conservation programs reducing their import 
requirements, as well as increased exportation to the OPEC coun-
tries, attraction of petrodollar-financed foreign investment, and 
development of some type of emergency international financing fa-
cility in order to enable necessary imports to be made until a perma-
nent adjustment to high-priced oil is made. 
Significantly, the OPEC members have assured the Western 
industrialized countries that they do not wish to force them into 
bankruptcy, since OPEC's long-range prosperity depends on that of 
the developed world. OPEC is not unaware of the financial strait in 
which many nations have found themselves, and may be expected 
to cooperate in devising new methods for the importing countries to 
finance their imports. 
VI. PROBLEMS OF THE LESS-DEVELOPED IMPORTING 
COUNTRIES 
Although the less-developed countries, as a group, have sided 
with OPEC on international political issues and with Arab policy 
toward Israel, this has not resulted in any financial benefit to these 
countries in the way of discounted prices for oil or special payment 
terms. While less-developed countries do not have the massive oil 
requirements which industrial nations have, they have proportion-
ately less ability to pay for oil at present prices. They do not have 
the potential to increase exports to OPEC, and have less flexibility 
9
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in reducing oil requirements than do the United States and other 
industrial countries. The less-developed nations also have little bor-
rowing power due to their limited repayment capabilities. 
Many less-developed countries are interested in large scale for-
eign aid financed by OPEC, which would alleviate the capital shor-
tage and would enable needed oil imports to be financed. The need 
for these nations is less for gasoline and similar products than for 
petroleum-based fertilizers and chemicals, critical for the mainte-
nance of existing economic output. The OPEC members are increas-
ing foreign aid to these nations, but the outlook for them remains 
gloomier than for the rest of the world. The recent 10 percent in-
crease in OPEC oil puts a further burden on the Third World im-
porters. 
VII. INTERIM FINANCIAL MEASURES 
Several measures are now in effect as a result of the oil crisis, 
many involving the cooperation and participation of OPEC. The 
most important of these arrangements is the International Mone-
tary Fund's oil facility. This facility was created in June 1974, to 
assist IMF members in meeting the initial impact of the increase 
in oil costs, and is supplementary to the Fund's existing borrowing 
arrangements. Conditions for use of this facility are that the borrow-
ing country must have a balance of payments problem as a result 
of the increased cost of petroleum imports and must be following 
domestic conservation policies which are not inconsistent with solu-
tion of the problem. Initial financing for the facility has been pro-
vided by loans from several OPEC members. The initial amount 
available for loan was approximately SDR 3 billion ($3.6 billion), 
and, while originally considered only an interim measure, the facil-
ity is being expanded. 15 
Many Third World oil importers, who are primarily commodity 
producers, are attempting to organize strong cartels, similar to 
OPEC, for their export commodities, so that they can become more 
able to finance oil imports as well as able to stabilize earnings from 
their most important resources. 16 There are also demands from im-
porters that world prices for these commodities be indexed to oil 
prices, so that the terms of trade for those exports and oil imports 
will remain stable. 
15. IMF ANN . REP., supra note 2, at 52. 
16. Martin & Ricklefs, 'Third World' Presses to Stabilize the Prices of its Raw Mat erials, 
Wall St. J ., July 3, 1975, at 1, col. 6. 
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In addition, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), composed of 24 industrialized countries, has 
established an energy agency to promote more efficient oil usage 
among nations and to assist those experiencing shortages.'7 
VIII. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
There remains the long-range question of a permanent solution 
to the oil and petrodollar situation. There is no lack of plans to 
recycle petrodollars and to establish facilities for deficit nations to 
finance oil imports. The international banking system appears to 
have withstood the initial challenge of accomodating the massive 
flows of petrodollars and has in fact limited the growth of 
Eurodollars (largely created by petrodollar deposits) in recent 
months. 18 
It may develop that the oil payments crisis will cease to be a 
crisis, and it may develop that petrodollar surpluses will decline as 
oil producers step up spending for development. Hishman Nazer, 
Minister Without Portfolio in the Saudi government, recently 
stated: "[A] petrodollar recycling problem doesn't exist [in Saudi 
Arabia] ." 19 Estimates of the eventual size of the petrodollar surplus 
are being reduced by many observers, and a significant amount of 
excess productive capacity has emerged in most OPEC countries. 20 
While the financial problem is still severe for most importers, exist-
ing institutional arrangements, in combination with restraints on 
demand, have prevented disaster and disruption in the deficit coun-
tries. 
Perhaps the major need today is for effective coordination and 
consultation within the existing international organization, avoid-
ing a "go-it-alone" approach to oil problems. No approach should 
be based on the expectation that OPEC can be persuaded to lower 
prices. As Iranian Oil Minister Jamshid Amouzegar stated prior to 
a recent conference of oil producers and consumers: "If the dialogue 
starts with arguments that the price of oil must come down, the 
meeting is doomed. "21 
Effective consultation and coordination can be helped, how-
17. Farmanfarmaian, Gutowski, Oki ta, Roosa & Wilson, How Can the World Afford 
OPEC Oil?, 53 Foa. Arr. 217-19 (1975) . 
18. Bus. WEEK, supra note 9. 
19. Vicker, The Saudis Look to the Future, Wall St. J ., Mar. 28, 1975, at 4, col. 4. 
20. Stabler, supra note 10, at 4, col. 4; Tavner, Country Oil Price Rise is likely to be 
Small; Goal is Saving OPEC, Wall St. J., June 27, 1975, at 1, col. 1. 
21. Bus. WEEK, supra note 1, at 35. 
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ever, by the realization that oil exporters and importers have many 
areas of joint interest. Most serious proposals for handling the oil 
financing and recycling problem are based on this cooperation. For 
the short term, British Chancellor of the Exchequer Denis Healey 
advocated the existing IMF oil facility be expanded to $10 billion 
to be loaned by the OPEC members and reloaned to importing 
countries with unmanageable debts. 22 While only an interim solu-
tion, it would allow OPEC members more input into IMF manage-
ment, and concern has been expressed about the potential political 
leverage this would give OPEC in deficit countries. 
A more comprehensive, but still interim, plan is the Kissinger 
proposal for a $25 billion mutual support system, involving borrow-
ing guarantees to the industrial nations and OECD borrowing in 
financial markets on the behalf of member countries. 23 This plan 
required nations to adhere to conservation of energy as a condition 
of the guarantee, and would still allow the price mechanism to oper-
ate. 
Among more permanent solutions, there are proposals for an 
International Commodity Agreement on oil, involving both export-
ers and importers, which would involve stability of prices and out-
put, to the benefit of both parties. 24 Guido Carli, the recently retired 
Governor of the Bank of Italy and a leading international financial 
expert, has proposed a program based on the conviction that no 
country would import more goods and services than it could export. 
This plan requires extensive international cooperation and plan-
ning, in which OPEC petrodollar surpluses would be used to finance 
needed goods and services for the underdeveloped world. 25 If imple-
mented, this plan would be reminiscent of the postwar Marshall 
Plan, and should allow oil importing nations to escape permanent 
indebtedness. 
Perhaps the most far reaching plan is that for a permanent 
institutional structure, based on joint interests of the producers and 
consumers, which would be a recycling bank to provide loans to oil 
importers by using OPEC surplus funds. An OPEC trust fund would 
be created to invest in Western government securities, or an OPEC 
mutual investment trust could be created to invest in equities.26 
22. Bus. WEEK, Jan. 27, 1975, at 132. 
23. Bus. WEEK, supra note 9. 
24. N. JACOBY, MULTINATIONAL OIL 277 (1974). 
25. Bus. WEEK, supra note 11. 
26. Farmanfarmaian, supra note 17, at 216-17. 
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This would allay fears of massive takeovers of Western business, 
while providing OPEC with a permanent stake in the industrial 
world. This proposal is designed to stablize relationships with the 
industrial world. The United States, for example, would gain both 
capital inflows from increasing international earnings due to partici-
pation in large-scale development programs in such nations as Iran 
and Saudi Arabia, and a greatly increased demand for U.S. goods 
an:d services in expanded OPEC markets. Even the recent change 
to pricing OPEC oil in SDR's rather than dollars could benefit the 
United States, as the recent strength of the dollar compared with 
other currencies in which the value of the SDR is determined could 
result in a somewhat lower dollar cost of OPEC oil. 
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